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The advent of the international financial crisis, and of its effects on the economy, all the 
world now face the question how to manage the crisis and what measures to implement 
to restore a normal condition. In this paper we present and discuss the results and 
implications of an international expert survey. Our target is to understand the perception 
with regards to several aspects of the international financial crisis and some possible 
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Mr Ryan:  
“Some also have been pointing to a concern about subprime lending. And just yesterday, 
Freddie Mac said that it would tighten its lending standards It seems to some of us that this is a 
small part of the market and unlikely to cause major problems, but I would be curious about 
your take on that.” 
Mr. Bernanke: 
”There certainly have been some concerns raised about the health of the subprime sector. We have 
seen increasing rate of default. We have seen financial distress on the part of lenders. And so that 
is a concern. We are monitoring that situation very carefully, and it was one of the factors, I 
think,  which  has  contributed  to  some  unease  about  the  economy,  about  the  market.  Our 
assessment, though, while this is a very important problem and an issue obviously for many 
people who are facing foreclosure, our assessment is that there is not much indication at this point 
that subprime mortgage issues have spread into the broader mortgage market, which still seems to 
be healthy, and the lending side of that still seems to be healthy. So it is a concern. But at this 
point, we do not see it as being a broad financial concern or a major factor in assessing the course 
of the economy.” 
 
110th Congress House Hearings (Washington, DC, February 28, 2007) 
 
 
1 – Introduction 
In august 2007 the world started to face one of the most dramatic economic 
crises of the recent history. At the beginning it seemed that this crisis would have 
been limited to financial sectors. But after some months the situation became 
clear: both the financial and the economic world were immersed in a very critical 
state.  
These extraordinary circumstances made us conscious of the importance of the 
appropriate  perception  of  the  crisis.  Indeed,  different  views  and  different 
approaches to the crisis made (and make) very difficult to agree on what the 
causes and the consequences of this situation really are. The use of the surveys is 
today become very useful in the economic science and its economic validity is 
widely recognized. This instrument is used in many areas of economics to predict 
and to analyze the behaviour of economic agents. The survey methodology is a 
direct way to study and understand perceptions and feelings of economic players. 
Examples are indices to forecast future performances of the economy (as the 
Economic Sentiment Indicator elaborated by the European Commission) or to 
measure  consumer  confidence  (as  for  US  consumers,  the  Conference  Board 
Consumer Confidence Index).  
So, our goal is to catch the global perception of the crisis through the direct 
insight  of  some  categories  of  economic  agents.  To  this  end  we  prepared  an 
articulated questionnaire
1 and we have sent it to university professors, researchers, 
financial journalists and managers. At the end of our survey we collected 772 
answers from all over the world. The sample is large enough to make possible to 
draw some conclusions on several aspects of the ongoing crisis.  
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But, before analysing the answers of our respondents, it is useful to briefly sum 
up the global situation just before the mailing of the questionnaire and during the 
collecting of the answers. Understanding the impossibility to summarize all the 
events happened that is beyond our goal, we put a particular attention over the 
period around our survey. In this way one can better understand the economic 
situation in which the feeling of the respondents is born. 
First signals of the subprime crisis arose in the middle of 2007, say from June to 
August, when two hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns, Countrywide and IKB 
announced  financial  difficulties  caused  by  the  subprime  mortgages  and  when 
BNP Paribas suspended three of its funds for the same reason. It is also in this 
period that Central Banks started to inject money into the financial system.  
Even if they are important, these events could be interpreted as normal (financial) 
events. It is only months later that it were clear that something different from 
normal  difficulties  were  happening.  Financial  and  economic  bad  news  was 
released as an apparently interminable chain contradicting repeatedly who says 
“the worst is over” and forcing all to define this crisis as “once in a century” and 
to match it to the Great Depression. 
In September 2007 Northern Rock asked the Bank of England for a liquidity 
support facility but this new induced many customers to withdraw their savings 
and the Federal Reserve started to cut the interest rate (by 50 basis points in 
September 2007 and by additional 25 basis points in October 2007) aggressively. 
In late September, it was announced that the Glitnir bank would be nationalised. 
This is the first step of the Iceland Crisis. Indeed, during the following weeks, 
other two banks, the Landsbanki and the Kaupthing banks (the largest Iceland’s 
bank) and the same Glitnir bank were placed into receivership. These signals 
highlighted the critical situation of this nation. Since then, the Iceland economy 
and  the  Krona  started  to  suffer  for  the  crisis  and  for  speculation  in  a  very 
dramatic way. 
In November 2007, US commercial banks started to announce heavy losses due 
to the subprime crisis and in the following months, the Federal Reserve cut, in 
three different meetings, the interest rate by 25 (December), 75 (January 2008) 
and 50 (January 2008) basis points. The FED, in December 2007, also instituted a 
new program to “address elevated pressures in short-term funding markets”, the 
Term Auction Facility, and, in March 2008, it announces an expansion of its 
securities  lending  program  (the  Term  Securities  Lending  Facility).  In  the 
meantime, addressed as a cause of the financial crisis as consequence of their (too 
generous) ratings for structured financial products, rating agencies announced a 
self reform (February 2008). 
In February 2008, Northern Rock was definitively nationalized, and it was March 
2008 when Bear Stearns, one of the largest global investment banks, in order to 
avert a sudden collapse received an emergency loan by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York before to be sold to JPMorgan Chase with the approval of the 
FED.  In  that  month  the  Fed  cut  the  Federal  Funds  rate  by  75  basis  points 
(2.25%) Other 25 basis points were cut by the FED Board in April 2008 when 
the Lehman Brothers liquidates three floundering investment funds. In June, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation announced that it has arrested about 300 real 
estate industry players since March in its crackdown on incidents of mortgage 
fraud that have contributed to the country’s housing crisis, and the Standard & The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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Poor’s cut the Lehman Brothers rating. In July, IndyMac Bank, a mortgage bank, 
was placed into conservatorship by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) creating the IndyMac Federal Bank, a bridge bank created to manage 
assets and liabilities of the failed IndyMac Bank. 
On  the  other  side  of  Atlantic  the  European  Central  Bank  concerned  about 
inflationary pressures deriving from record crude oil prices increased the interest 
rate by 25 basis points. So in July 2008, the spread between the ECB MRO rate 
and the FED Funds rate was equal to 2.25%. 
September 2008 maybe is the month in which the situation has become even 
worse. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which owned or guaranteed about half of 
the  US  mortgage  market,  were  nationalized.  The  Lehman  Brothers  filed  for 
protection under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy law
2 and Bank of America bought 
its  concurrent  Merrill  Lynch  avoiding  its  failure.  The  US  Office  of  Thrift 
Supervision  (OTS)  seized  Washington  Mutual  Bank,  which  was  the  largest 
savings and loan association in US, from Washington Mutual, a savings bank 
holding company, and placed it into the receivership of the FDIC. Its assets were 
sold  to  JPMorgan  Chase  and  the  holding  company  Washington  Mutual 
subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Washington Mutual closure 
and receivership represents the largest bank failure in American financial history
3. 
The  American  International  Group  (AIG),  a  major  American  insurance 
corporation, suffered a liquidity crisis after its credit ratings were downgraded and 
the Federal Reserve created an $85 billion credit facility to enable the company to 
meet  collateral  and  other  cash  obligations.  In  addition,  the  Federal  Reserve 
approved applications by the last two major independent investment banks on 
Wall  Street,  Goldman  Sachs  and  Morgan  Stanley,  to  become  bank  holding 
companies. On 18 September, Britain's financial regulator temporarily banned the 
short-selling of shares in financial companies that are listed on the London Stock 
Exchange and the following day the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
temporarily banned investors from short-selling 799 financial companies. This 
measure  has  been  adopted  in  many  stock  markets  during  the  most  negative 
period of the crisis.  
September 2008 was also the month in which the financial crisis clearly hit the 
Euro area, considered until then almost immune to major financial problems and 
better  positioned  with  respect  to  the  crisis.  The  governments  of  Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands inject about 11.2 billion Euro into Fortis bank 
and Dexia bank got about 6.4 billion Euro three-state bailout (Belgium, France 
and Luxemburg). The Irish government guaranteed all deposits and debts of the 
country's  major  banks  and  after  this  measure  other  European  governments 
reached  the  same  decision.  Moreover,  the  same  action  was  decided  by  the 
Australian Government in October. 
Given the absolute critical situation, from all around the world, governments and 
public authorities, in October, arose the pace of intervention to counter for the 
now international, and not only US, deep financial crisis. On 3 October, the US 
Congress  approved  the  so  called  Paulson  plan,  the  Troubled  Asset  Relief 
Program  (TARP).  The  program  allows  the  United  States  Department  of  the 
                                                 
2 The filing marked the largest bankruptcy in US history. 
3 Before the receivership action, it was the sixth-largest bank in the United States The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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Treasury  to  purchase  or  insure  up  to  $700  billion  of  “troubled”  assets  from 
financial institutions in order to strengthen the financial sector. Wells Fargo and 
Wachovia announced their intention to merge. The Dutch Government bought 
the Fortis Bank Nederland Holding, Fortis Verzekeringen Nederland and Fortis 
Corporate Insurance. This transaction replaced the previous capital injection. On 
6 October, the Dutch Government sold the 75 per cent of Fortis Bank to BNP 
Paribas  that  also  bought  the  100  per  cent  of  Fortis  Insurance  Belgium.  The 
German  state  and  financial  institutions  put  together  a  50  billion-euro  rescue 
package for Hypo Real Estate Holding. Denmark and Germany said they will 
guarantee all their countries’ bank deposits.   
Stock markets around the world continued to suffer big falls. The Dow Jones 
Industrial, the Nikkei 225 and the Eurostoxx 50 respectively loose the 25, the 38 
and the 32 per cent with respect to August 2007. 
Acting co-ordinately and with an unprecedented action, on 8 October, several 
Central  Banks  cut  interest  rates  simultaneously  trying  to  restore  the  market 
confidence:  the  Federal  Reserve,  the  European  Central  Bank,  the  Bank  of 
England, the Bank of Canada, the Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank 
cut their respective interest rates by 50 basis points each. Two days after, the G7 
meeting focused on the international financial crisis was held in Washington. On 
14 October, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) announced a 
new program, the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, to strengthen the 
confidence and encourage liquidity in the banking system. Two days later, the 
French Parliament passed a plan for restoring confidence in the financial markets 
and for supporting the economy, and on 17, the German Parliament passed a 
plan for the stabilization of the financial system. Two days later, ING got ten 
billion euros from the Dutch Government. 
On 28 October 2008, we started the expert survey
4 while in the remaining 
days of the month the Federal Reserve and the Central Bank of Norway cut the 
interest rate by 50 basis points, the Central Bank of China by 27 basis points and 
the  Central  Bank  of  Japan  by  20  basis  points  (from  0.50%  to  0.30%). 
Furthermore,  during  the  same  days,  the  Dutch  Government  reinforced 
AEGON’s capital by 3 billion euro.  
The latest two months of 2008 are marked by additional actions in line with those 
implemented in previous months.  
On the same day (4
th November) of the election of the new US president Barack 
Obama, the Australian Central Bank cut the interest rate by 75 basis points. The 
action was followed two days later by other Central Banks around the world. The 
ECB, the Central Bank of Denmark and the Central Bank of Switzerland eased 
their  leading  interest  rates  by  50  basis  points.  The  Bank  of  England  cut  the 
interest rate by an awesome value of 150 basis points, the Central Bank of the 
Czech Republic slashed the interest rate by 75 basis points and later in the month 
the  Central  Bank  of  China  cut  the  interest  rate  by  108  basis  points.  The 
Citygroup, a major American financial services company, was rescued in a bailout 
(under the TARP program) by the US government, the Franklin Bank and the 
Security Pacific Bank failed. All signs that the US financial system were yet under 
strong stressed conditions. Also the fast growing China and the European Union 
                                                 
4 See Section 2 for more details. The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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(the Euro Area entered officially in recession for the first time from its creation) 
unveiled their anti-crisis plan. 
As sign to strong fight the financial crisis, the new elected US president Barack 
Obama  nominated  as  next  US  Treasury  Secretary  Timothy  Geithner,  former 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
The IMF approved a $16.4 billion Stand-By arrangement for Ukraine in order to 
stabilize the economic and financial systems on 5 November. Four days later, as 
just noticed, the Chinese Government announced a huge economic plan for an 
estimated $585 billion in spending and stimulus measures. On 10 November, 
Santander, the biggest Spanish bank, announced a 7.2 billion euro rights issue to 
raise its capital and the Latvian Government nationalized the Parex Bank.    
On  15  November,  an  extraordinary  G7  and  G20  meetings  focused  on  the 
international financial crisis ware held in Washington, in order to give a strong 
signal to financial markets. 
During December 2008, banks continued to fail as the London Scottish Bank (it 
was  forced  into  administration)  and  Central  Banks  continued  to  easing  the 
monetary policy through cuts of the interest rate. Interest rates cuts were of 75 
basis points, the ECB and the Central Bank of Denmark, of 100 basis points, the 
Central Bank of Australia and the Bank of England, and of 175 basis points for 
the Central Bank of Sweden. On 2 December, the Bank of Japan starts to accept 
BBB-rated corporate bonds as collateral.  
The expert survey ended on 4 December 2008 when more evidences, as the 
lost of 533.000 jobs in the US labour market in the only month of November, 
confirmed that the crisis was not more only financial but it also was hitting the 
real economy. 
These are the most important events, in our view, occurred before the onset of 
our  survey  and  during  the  collecting  of  the  answers.  In  this  way  one  can 
understand  better  the  answers  of  the  respondents  in  the  light  of  the  facts 
occurred. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we describe in details 
the structure of the questionnaire and the methodology used to submit it to the 
expert sample.  In Section 3 we show the results  of the survey in global and 
regional perspectives. Differences between Academics and non-Academics are 
reported in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes and analyses the most important 
features that emerge from the data and some political economic considerations. 
2 – The questionnaire and the expert sample 
After two fields asking the country and the job position of the interviewed, the 
questionnaire (see Appendix A) is composed by seven main questions, each one 
subdivided in different points. Moreover, there is a request for an opinion about 
when the crisis will end (or when a normal financial situation will be restored) and 
three final open questions. 
As mentioned above, the expert survey started on 28 October 2008 and finished 
on 04 December 2008. The participation to the survey was voluntary and the The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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resulting data have been treated and published
5 anonymously. The experts were 
selected from three areas. The first, and the great part, was selected from about 
five hundred universities all around the world following the ranking by Ranking 
Web
6.  In  details,  we  collected  e-mails  (publicly  available  on  the  web)  of  the 
academic staff of the departments related to economy and finance. The second 
group  is  composed  by  the  staff  of  firms  as  research  institutions,  banks  and 
financial  firms  in  general  (from  the  heads  to  the  analysts).  The  third  part  is 
composed by journalists in the economic and financial profession. For these last 
two groups, the e-mails were collected from different (free and publicly) sources 
on  the  web.  In  total  we  have  collected  about  21.000  e-mails,  subdivided  as 
follows: about 18.000 of academic staff; about 2.400 of enterprises staff; and 
about 600 economic and financial journalists. 
The questionnaire, then, has been attached to e-mails and sent. Given the high 
amount of e-mails to manage, we divided the sample in three sub-samples and we 
submitted the questionnaire separately in three different dates. In details, the first 
group of e-mails was  sent on Tuesday 28 October 2008, the  second one  on 
Tuesday 4 November 2008, and the last one on Tuesday 11 November 2008. 
Furthermore, a  reminder for each group was sent the  Thursday of  the week 
following the first sending (6, 13 and 20 November 2008). 
From 28 October 2008 and to 04 December 2008 we received 772 completed 
questionnaires equal to about 4 per cent of the e-mails that we sent. At a first 
sight, and as expected, the percentage of respondents could be considered low. 
However, you must take into consideration that a check of the area of research, 
for the academic staff, or of the formation and mansions, for journalists and for 
enterprises staff, was impossible in a reasonable time (and at our knowledge no 
such database is available) leading to the impossibility of carrying out any expert 
survey.  In  other  words,  we  counted  on  some  sort  of  self-selection  by  the 
contacted sample. In this light, the amount of respondents, in our opinion, is big 
enough to obtain useful information on the perception of the international crisis 
by experts. 
In  order  to  analyse  the  sample  of  the  respondents,  we  divided  it  between 
Academic and no-Academic (enterprises and journalists) staff and into six groups 
basis  on  the  geographical  area  of  the  respondents:  the  Asia  and  Oceania 
(Australia, China (including Hong Kong), India, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey and United Arab Emirates), the Emerging Europe 
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovakia), the Euro Area 
(Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Netherlands, 
Portugal,  Slovenia  and  Spain),  the  Other  America  (Argentina,  Brazil,  Canada, 
Chile, Colombia and Mexico), the UK and Scandinavians (Denmark,  Iceland, 
Norway,  Sweden  and  UK)  and  the  USA
7.  These  divisions  make  possible  to 
compare the results obtained in different areas of the World and by different type 
of respondents. 
                                                 
5  Some  preliminary  results  were  published  on  the  report  Cer  04/2008  “Dentro  la  crisi”  available  on 
www.centroeuroparicerche.it. 
6 For more details, go to www.webometrics.info. 
7 The respondents of South Africa (1) and Switzerland (12) are considered in the analysis of the total sample 
and for differences between the Academics and the non-Academics. The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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As regards  the  structure  of the  questionnaire, the first  question concerns the 
“factors contributing to the credit crisis”. The respondents have to rate with an 
“X” each of the factors (we proposed thirteen possible causes of the crisis) by 
marking the appropriate fields: “1” if the factor had “no role”; “2” if the factor 
had a “marginal role”; “3” if the factor had “some role”; “4” if the factor had an 
“Important role” and “5” if the factor had a “Key role”. Also the “I don’t know” 
option  is  provided.  In  this  way  it  is  possible  to  understand  the  degree  of 
consensus about the weight of each of these factors in contributing to the crisis.  
In this question, and as for the entire questionnaire, some doubts may arise about 
the choice of the proposed options. Given the impossibility (for space, time and 
for  the  need  of  futures  researches  on)  to  make  an  exhaustive  list  of  all  the 
possible  causes  of  the  crisis,  we  chose  some  widely  discussed  options  or  we 
proposed options related to our research interests. We are well aware that our 
survey “forgot” something important related to the crisis, but we had to balance 
different aspects.  
After the first question, we asked to our interviewees when, according to their 
view, “the crisis will end (or a normal financial situation will be restored)”. In 
addition to the “I don’t know” option, we proposed six options: “end of 2008”, 
“first half of 2009”, “second half of 2009”, “first half of 2010”, “second half of 
2010” and “2011”.  
The second question is focused on the possible measures that the policy makers 
can adopt in order to “fix the credit crisis today”. We propose eight options and 
the structure of the question is equal to that of the first question. While the third 
question (closely related to the second) is focused on the possible futures choices 
and tools that the policy makers could use in order “to avoid the credit crisis 
occurring again tomorrow”. In this case, we proposed three possible measures 
and, as usual, we asked to rate these measures by marking one of the available 
fields (“No role”, “Marginal role”, “Some role”, “Important role”, “Key role” 
and “I don’t know”).  
The structure of the fourth question is different from the previous ones. Indeed, 
we asked the economists to directly state a percentage that can indicate their 
preferences. Specifically, the question asked to choose between two fields, “the 
Fed monetary policy” or “market factors”, in order to show which of the two 
choices has been more responsible of the subprime crisis. Then, the interviewee 
had to choose a percentage for these two fields, whose sum must be equal to 100. 
In the second step, they had several options to choose from. Some of these 
options are related to the Fed's monetary policy, others are related to market 
factors. Even in this case they had to allocate a percentage for each field. The 
sum of the percentages of the sub-fields must be equals to the percentage of the 
relative upper field. We slightly transformed the percentages of some fields (with 
the appropriate weight in the upper field) in order to make more homogeneous 
the results and to list the various factors on the basis of their relative importance. 
In question 5, we asked to our interviewees to indicate how much they agree with 
five proposed statements. In this case we gave five fields (“0%”, “25%”, “50%”, 
“75%” and “100%”) plus the “I don’t know” option. So, the respondents had to 
choose one of the fields in order to express their level of agreement with the 
sentence.  The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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The question 6 is dedicated to the monetary policy. We focus our attention on 
the European Central Bank and on the Federal Reserve. We divided the question 
in four sub-questions. In fact, we want to analyse the feeling of the respondents 
towards the “interest rate policy”, the “regulatory and surveillance policy”, the 
“liquidity and bailout policy” and the “communication policy” of the two Central 
Banks. In this way we can examine four policy areas and compare the ECB and 
the FED results. Again, the respondents had to mark with an “X” one of the 
proposed  fields  (“0%”,  “25%”,  “50%”,  “75%”  and  “100%”)  or  the  “I  don’t 
know” field. In this way, they were able to “judge the optimality of monetary 
policy during the crisis”. 
Question 7 is similar to question 5, but in this case we proposed to indicate how 
much the respondents agree on some of the consequences of the financial crisis. 
We proposed five options and gave two open fields. Unfortunately, in this case, 
we committed an error of constructing. In Section 3.8, we present in details how 
the question was analyzed. 
For all the questions described above, we calculate the mean value of answers and 
the percentage
8 of respondents (see Appendix B for further details) for every field 
of the proposed factors. 
The questionnaire ends with three open questions; the first on the relationship 
between the “US housing market bubble” and the Federal Reserve, the second on 
“the international coordination among central banks in response to the credit 
crisis” and the third on “the possibility and the feasibility of an international 
authority with surveillance and regulatory powers on financial risks taken by the 
financial system”. 
In the following section we present the results. 
3 – The results of the expert survey 
In this section we examine the answers of the respondents. For convenience in 
the exposition, in the following subsections, we analyze the results considering 
each question of the questionnaire separately. Then, following its structure we 
analyze: 
1.  the factors contributing to the crisis (Question 1); 
2.  the length of the crisis; 
3.  the measures to fix the crisis (Question 2); 
4.  the measures to avoid the crisis occurring again (Question 3); 
5.  Fed vs. market factors (Question 4); 
6.  how do you agree? (Question 5); 
7.  the monetary policy of the Fed and the ECB (Question 6); 
8.  due to the financial crisis … (Question 7); 
9.  open questions. 
For each question and if not differently specified, in the analysis below we do not 
take into account who did not give any answer. In addition, the percentages, if 
                                                 
8 We did not consider the “I don’t know” field in the calculation of the mean value and percentage of 
respondents. In other words, the mean value and the percentage refer to respondents that expressed a 
preference. Sometimes, we presented percentages related to the “I don’t know” field; in this case the 
percentage refers to the all sample that replied without indicating a clear preference. See Appendix B for 
more details. The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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not  differently  specified,  are  expressed  without  counting  the  “I  don’t  know” 
option. 
3.1 – Question 1: Factors contributing to the crisis 
As mentioned above, the first question is focused on the “factors contributing to 
the credit crisis”. The respondents gave a very clear answer to the first question.  
According to our expert survey, the most important factor in contributing to the 
crisis has been “the increasing share of approvals of mortgages to borrowers with 
low credit ratings (subprime mortgages) in the 2000s” that registered a mean 
value of 4.45. Looking at the distribution of answers (see Figure 1), the 60.16 per 
cent  of  the  respondents  marked  the  “key  role”  field  and  the  28.36  per  cent 
marked the “important role” option. This factor is undoubtedly recognized as the 


















No role Marginal role Some role Important role Key role
 
Figure 1: The distribution of the answers for: “The increasing share of approvals of 
mortgages to borrowers with low credit ratings (sub prime mortgages) in the 2000s”. 
 
In the group of the factors that got a high score we find “the housing market 
bubble”  (4.32),  “the  wide  use  and  international  diffusion  of  mortgage  linked 
derivative  instruments  such  as  ABS  (Asset  Backed  Securities)  and  CDO 
(Collateralized Debt Obligations)” (4.28), “a regulation inadequate to keep apace 
with  the  deep  and  fast  financial  innovation”  (4.27)  and  “the  misleading 
quantification  (by  rating  agencies)  of  derivative  instruments’  counterpart  and 
liquidity risks” (4.22). More than the 70 per cent of the respondents marked the 
“important role” or the “key role” fields in these cases. It seems that these factors 
collect a wide consensus. 
The respondents did not recognize a so high importance for the other factors as 
the “low capitalization of banks and financial intermediaries with respect to the 
risks  taken  by  them”  (3.83),  the  “too  aggressive  earning  policy  by  bank  and 
financial system management” (3.75), the “easy monetary policy by the Fed in the 
early 2000s” (3.73, see Figure 2), “the fragmentation (among various authorities) 
of the surveillance system in the US” (3.64), the “moral hazard by the mortgage The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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formerly state owned insurers (i.e. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac)” (3.64) and the 
“moral  hazard  by  financial/insurance  firms  too  big  to  fail  (i.e.  Bear  Stearns, 
AIG)” (3.63). 
The above six factors show a distribution with a peak in “important role” field. 
So,  it  is  possible  to  group  these  factors:  they  are  important,  but  not  as 
fundamental as the first five factors previously mentioned. In all these six cases, 
the “important role” and the “key role” options collect together more than the 50 
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Figure 2: The distribution of the answers for: “Easy monetary policy by the Fed in the 
early 2000s”. 
 
But, notwithstanding these differences in the feelings of our respondents, it is 
correct to affirm that, according to the economists, there are five fundamental 
factors and other six significant causes of the crisis. These eleven factors have had 
a determinant role in contributing to the international crisis. 
The remaining two factors are linked with the Federal Reserve monetary policy 
and in these cases the “marginal role” field is the most chosen option. So, the 
“changes of the monetary policy stance by the Fed in the 2000s (e.g. the strong 
variability of the Federal Funds rate)” (with a mean value of 2.32) and the “tight 
monetary  policy  by  the  Fed  before  the  sub  prime  crisis  (in  2005-06)”  (2.21) 
factors had a very limited role according to the interviewees. Indeed, more than 
the 50 per cent of the economists chose the “no role” or the “marginal role” 
options. 
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Figure 3: The distribution of the answers for: “Tight monetary policy by the Fed before 
the subprime crisis (in 2005-06)”. 
 
This is the global vision. But there are important diversifications in the different 
regions.  
Even if it is not considered important, the “tight monetary policy by the Fed 
before the sub prime crisis (in 2005-06)” factor in causing the credit crisis shows 
a significative difference in the mean value between the US, on the one side, and 
the Euro Area and the Emerging Europe, on the other side. The United States 
show a mean value of 1.96 (the lowest among the six groups considered) against a 
2.50 of the Euro Area (the highest) and a 2.39 of the Emerging Europe group. 
Other factors present mean values close to each other for the areas examined. 
With respect to the third factor (“changes of the monetary policy by the Fed in 
the 2000s”), the distribution of the UK and Scandinavians group shows a high 
peak in the “marginal role” field. This is the unique important difference that we 
notice. Indeed, the mean of the UK and Scandinavians group and the ones of the 
other groups are in line with the global case. 
As regards, “the housing market bubble”, we notice another particular feature: in 
all the groups, except the Euro Area, the most important option is the “key role” 
one. Indeed, in the Euro Area, we observe the peak of the distribution in the 
“important role” field. 
The US and the Other America groups have a different feeling towards “the 
misleading  quantification  (by  rating  agencies)  of  derivative  instruments’ 
counterpart and liquidity risks”. In fact, differently from other areas, in these two 
zones the “key role” field is the one with the highest number of choices. So, in 
America  the  economists  that  we  interviewed  consider  the  role  of  the  rating 
agencies of primary importance.  
Another important feature that we want to underline is the approach of the US 
economists  of  this  survey  towards  the  moral  hazard.  We  notice  that  the 
distribution of answers to the question on “the moral hazard by the mortgage 
formerly state owned insurers (i.e. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac)” has a higher mean 
in comparison with the other areas. This fact implies that the economists of this 
zone  give  a  great  emphasis  to  the  behaviour  of  these  financial  institutions. The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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Probably, they attribute a higher vote because they have directly experienced the 
consequences of such behaviour. 
Looking at the distributions of answers, the Asia and Oceania group attributed a 
higher importance to four factors in comparison with the global mean. Indeed, in 
this area the “easy monetary policy by the Fed in the early 2000s”, the “moral 
hazard by the mortgage formerly state owned insurers (i.e. Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac)” and the “moral hazard by financial/insurance firms too big to fail (i.e. Bear 
Stearns,  AIG)”  show  higher  percentage  in  the  “key  role”  field.  The  “too 
aggressive earning policy by bank and financial system management” factor got 
the highest percentage of votes in the “key role” field, differently from the global 
mean. On the other hand, respondents of this area attributed a lower degree of 
importance to “the fragmentation (among various authorities) of the surveillance 
system in the US” factor (see the Appendix B for further data). 
The Emerging Europe group also provides different results. “The fragmentation 
(among various authorities) of the surveillance system in the US” and the “low 
capitalization of banks and financial intermediaries with respect to the risks taken 
by them” factors have a lower degree of importance in comparison with the 
global results. “The misleading quantification (by rating agencies) of derivative 
instruments’ counterpart and liquidity risks” is only an important factor and not a 
key factor, as recorded in the global mean. The “too aggressive earning policy by 
bank  and  financial  system  management”  factor  shows  a  division  of  the 
respondents between the “key role” and the “some role” options, while in the 
global mean is the “important role” field that got the highest percentage. The 
group undoubtedly gave less importance to the “moral hazard by the mortgage 
formerly state owned insurers (i.e. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac)” factor, while the 
result is mixed for the “moral hazard by financial/insurance firms too big to fail 
(i.e. Bear Stearns, AIG)” factor. Indeed, in this last case, the group shows the 
highest percentage in both the “some role” and “key role” fields. 
The answers of the Euro Area group are in line with the global averages. There is 
only  a  slightly  different  view  about  “the  misleading  quantification  (by  rating 
agencies) of derivative instruments’ counterpart and liquidity risks” factor. The 
Euro Area equally divided the votes between the “important role” and the “key 
role” fields, while the global mean shows a clear dominance of the “key role” 
option.  These  are  little  differences,  but  they  are  in  any  case  important  to 
understand the different feelings. 
The results calculated for the Other America group are in line with the global 
perception,  except  for  the  “low  capitalization  of  banks  and  financial 
intermediaries with respect to the risks taken by them” factor that has received 
the highest percentage of answers in the “key role” field, while in the global mean 
the “important role” is the preferred option.  
In the UK and Scandinavians group the “easy monetary policy by the Fed in the 
early  2000s”  factor  shows  a  higher  percentage  in  the  “key  role”  field  in 
comparison with the global situation. This is the only case in which respondents 
have attributed a higher role to the factors we proposed in comparison with the 
global mean. Indeed, this group attributed a lower degree of importance to “the 
fragmentation (among various authorities) of the surveillance system in the US” 
and  to  “the  misleading  quantification  (by  rating  agencies)  of  derivative 
instruments’ counterpart and liquidity risks” factors. Moreover, it seems that the The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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economists of this area are more prudent about the role of the moral hazard (see 
the percentages of the last two factors) in contributing to the crisis.  
At  the  end,  the  respondents  from  the  USA  showed  perceptions  in  line  with 
global mean. There are only limited differences. For example, we can mention the 
reduction of the percentage of the “key role” option for the “easy monetary 
policy by the Fed in the early 2000s” factor or, on the other hand, the higher 
percentage of the “key role” field for the moral hazard factors in comparison 
with the global results. 
3.2 – The length of the crisis 
After the factors that contributed to the crisis, we asked a judgment on its length.  
Figure 4 shows the total distribution. Not considering, for the moment, the “I 
don’t know” option, a very clear result emerges from the answers. About the 60 
per cent of the respondents, thinks that the crisis will probably end during the 
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Figure 4: The distribution of the answers for: “In your view, the crisis will end (or a 
normal financial situation will be restored) by”. 
  
But, we can also notice that a percentage slightly below the 50 per cent think that 
the crisis will end in 2010 (“first half of 2010”: 31.97 per cent, “second half of 
2010”: 17.70 per cent). At the same time, the 34.75 per cent of the respondents 
chose the first three options: according to these economists, the crisis will end 
before the end of 2009. Finally, the 15.57 per cent thinks that a normal situation 
will be only restored in 2011.  
So, in sum, the respondents think that the crisis will last at least for one more 
year. Besides, the 15 per cent of the respondents think that the crisis will last for 
two years. In any case, the scenario that emerges from these data it is not so 
comforting. 
The  regional  analysis  underlines  two  main  features.  The  respondents  of  the 
Emerging  Europe  group  are  the  most  optimistic  among  the  economists  we The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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interviewed. Indeed, more than the 60 per cent of the respondents of this area 
think that the crisis will end in 2009. The 18.75 per cent of these economists 
chose the “2011” field, but the distribution of the answers of this area is very 
different from the others. Probably they are more optimistic because in this area 
the economic growth is very strong and they think that these economies will only 
experience a reduction in the speed of their growth. 
On the other hand, the most pessimistic economists live in the Asia and Oceania 
and in the UK and Scandinavians groups. In the first group about the 78 per cent 
chose the last three options (“first half of 2010”, “second half of 2010”, “2011”) 
and about the 23 per cent chose the last one (“2011”). So, their perception is that 
the crisis will be more prolonged than the other economists expect. In the UK 
and Scandinavians group the situation is very similar. About the 72 per cent chose 
the last three disposable options and about the 25 per cent chose the last option 
(“2011”). So in these two areas it emerges a higher degree of pessimism.  
In the remaining regions, as one can see observing Figure 5, the distribution is 
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Figure 5: The end of the crisis, the distribution of the answers in the different 
areas. 
 
3.3 – Question 2: Measures to fix the crisis 
The second question is focused on the possible measures that the policy makers 
can adopt in order to fix the crisis. We propose eight options. Three options 
show a distribution with a high percentage in the “important role” and the “key 
role” fields (see Appendix B for more data). Indeed, the respondents think that 
the “public capital injection into banks (public recapitalization)” has a crucial role. 
More than the 60 per cent have chosen the “important role” (38.72 per cent) and 
the “key role” (23.50 per cent) options and the factor have a mean value of 3.69. 
We get a very similar result (57.60%, composed by a 35.87 and a 21.73 per cent 
respectively for the “important” and  the “key role” option) for “the liquidity The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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pumped into markets by Central Banks” (3.63). The third important measure is 
the “extensions of the deposit assurance by Governments” with an average value 
of 3.41. In this case the 48.11 per cent of the respondents think that this can be 
an important or a key measure. And there is a 31.54 per cent that thinks that such 
a measure can have “some role” in order to fix the crisis. In sum, these three 
options are considered as the most important ones in order to mitigate the effects 
of the crisis. 
“The institution of a clearing house by Central Banks for interbank markets” 
could be a positive measure according to a score of 3.21. The 12.83 per cent of 
the respondents think that this action can have a “key role” for fixing the crisis. 
At the same time, the “some role” and the “important role” options show high 
percentages, respectively the 32.50 and the 27.83 per cent. So, the institution of a 
clearing house for the interbank markets is considered important but not so basic.  
We get a similar result (3.26) for “The Fed Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(CPFF) to buy commercial papers” measure. In this case, the “some role”, the 
“important role” and the “key role” options respectively show respectively the 
following percentages: 37.85%, 31.38% and 10.00%. These two measures have 
not a strong positive support in those who responded. 
The average result is ever worse (2.90) for “the US Toxic Assets Relief Project 
(TARP)  to  buy  toxic  assets”  option.  The  percentages  of  the  “some  role”, 
“important role” and “key role” fields are 34.42%, 21.42% and 7.98%.  
With a mean of 2.83, “the institution of supranational funds for Europe and Asia 
countries” received a not so high consensus among our interviewees. We observe 
the highest percentages in the “some role” and in the “marginal role” fields (29.43 
and 33.50 per cent). Also the “temporary bans on short sales of financial stocks” 
(2.31) option is rejected by economists. Indeed, the fields that show the highest 
percentages are the “marginal role” and the “no role”. In this case, the 33.33 per 
cent of the economists chose the “marginal role” field and the 28.95 per cent 
chose the “no role” option. 
Summarizing, according to our respondents, these last three measures are not 
considered useful for the mitigation of the ongoing crisis. 
An  interesting  feature  for  the  “public  capital  injection  into  banks  (public 
recapitalization)” option emerges looking at the USA and UK and Scandinavians 
groups. The first group is denoted by a mean value of 3.55 (one of the lowest) 
while the second one by a mean of 3.96 which represents the highest value. 
A similar difference in mean values there is in the role of the “extensions of the 
deposit  assurance  by  Governments”  between  the  Euro  Area  and  the  United 
States with the first group strongly supporting this measure respect the second 
one (3.68 against 3.26). Moreover, the Euro Area distribution show a peak in the 
“important role” field while, in the USA, the “some role” option has the highest 
number of votes. 
Very interesting is also the average agreement showed by “the US Toxic Assets 
Relief Project (TARP) to buy toxic assets” measure in different areas. The area 
that  registered  the  lowest  mean  value  is  the  USA  area  with  a  2.74,  closely 
followed by the Asia and Oceania with 2.77. Other areas registered higher value 
with the highest mean for the Other America group (3.26). It is curious to note 
that the economists living in the area in which the Government has implemented 
this measure believe that it is not useful. The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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Another difference between the Euro Area group and the USA and UK and 
Scandinavians groups could be individuated for “temporary bans on short sales 
of financial stocks”. The Euro Area group with a mean value of 2.68 seems to 
give some role to this measure while the other two groups judged it of marginal 
role, 2.05 for the USA and 2.18 for the UK and Scandinavians. Furthermore, 
examining  the  distributions  we  notice  that  in  the  USA  and  in  the  UK  and 
Scandinavians groups the “no role” field obtained the highest number of votes. 
Finally, the USA and the Euro Area show a sort of divergence on valuing “the 
institution of a clearing house by Central Banks for interbank markets”: 3.02 for 
the first and 3.50 for the latter. But there is another particular feature: we can 
notice that in the USA the majority of the respondents chose the “I don't know” 
field.  This  means  that  in  this  group  the  economists  have  a  high  degree  of 
uncertainty about this subject. 
For answers’ distribution, the Asia and Oceania group judged that the liquidity 
pumped by Central Banks into markets can have only “some role” in fixing the 
crisis. They have a less degree of confidence towards this measure than the one 
showed  by  the  global  mean.  At  the  same  time  these  respondents  are  more 
sceptical  about  the  usefulness  of  the  Fed  CPFF.  Indeed,  the  “marginal  role” 
option shows a higher percentage in comparison with the “important role” one. 
The feeling towards the utility of a clearing house for interbank markets is equally 
doubtful (the “marginal role” option shows the highest percentage). As regards 
“the extensions of the deposit assurance by Governments and the institution of 
supranational funds for Europe and Asia countries”, the group is more confident 
in the effectiveness of these tools. 
The  respondents  of  the  Euro  Area  group  attribute  more  attention  to  the 
“extensions of the deposit assurance by Governments”. In fact, in this case the 
“important role” is the first option (38.86 per cent), while the “some role” option 
is  the  first  in  the  global  mean.  At  the  same  time,  they  seem  to  have  more 
confidence in the effectiveness of “temporary bans on short sales of financial 
stocks” and on the role of the “institution of a clearing house by Central Banks 
for interbank markets”.  
A higher level of scepticism about the usefulness of the FED CPFF is registered 
for the Emerging Europe group. One can draw the same conclusion about the 
role of “temporary bans on short sales of financial stocks”. In this case the “some 
role”  option  shows  a  higher  percentage  in  comparison  with  the  global  mean 
(31.58% vs. 20.20%). Finally, there is a not so clear feeling towards the TARP. 
Indeed, in this case the first option chosen by the respondents is the “marginal 
role”, while the second one is the “important role”. So, the result leads to a mixed 
interpretation.  But,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  the  number  of  the 
respondents is not very elevated in this group. So, these data are not as robust as 
in the other areas. 
For the USA, as regards the TARP, the distribution of the answers is similar to 
the global case but the “marginal role” field shows a higher percentage (29.37% 
vs. 24.52 %). Another sign of how the USA sample is more pessimists about the 
results of this plan. At the same time, the US respondents have no confidence in 
the role of the temporary bans on short sales of financial stocks. Indeed, in this case the 
first option is the “no role” field that shows a very elevated percentage (38.71 %). 
The other results are in line with the global mean.  The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
 
18 
In the Other America group we find different features. For example, according to 
the economists of this zone the public capital injection into banks has a “key role” in 
order to fix the crisis. The “key role” option shows a very high percentage (35.59 
%). At the same time, we observe the same positive feeling towards the Fed 
CPFF, the Toxic Assets Relief Project and the role of the liquidity pumped into 
markets by Central Banks. In all these cases the distribution attributes a higher 
weight to the “important role” and “key role” fields. 
The respondents in the UK and Scandinavians group have a positive approach 
towards the liquidity pumped into markets by Central Banks (both the “important role” 
and the “key role” fields show higher percentages in comparison with the global 
mean) and towards the FED CPFF (the “important role” option get the highest 
percentage). Even in this case, as for the USA, the economists think that the 
temporary bans on short sales of financial stocks can have “no role” in order to solve the 
ongoing crisis. 
3.4 – Question 3: Measures to avoid the crisis occurring again 
This question is focused on the possible choices and tools that the policy makers 
can use in order to avoid that a similar crisis will occur again.  
The first measure we propose is the “regulation and supervision of the rating 
agencies  by  market  authorities”.  The  mean  value  of  3.78  and  the  answers’ 
distribution (Figure 6) leaves no doubts. The “key role” option shows the highest 
percentage among all the options. This is an unquestionable result. More than the 
60 per cent of the respondents chose the “important role” or the “key role” 
options. So, the economists think that the activity and the procedures of the 
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Figure 6: The distribution of the answers for: “Regulation and supervision of the rating 
agencies by market authorities”. 
  
We get an even higher value, 4.10, for the second measure we proposed. Indeed, 
we asked if “more stringent capital and operational risk requirements for banks 
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crisis. More than the 70 per cent of the respondents have chosen the “important 
role” or the “key role” options, with the last showing the highest number of 
votes. So, even in this case the economists are unanimous: it is necessary to re-
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Figure 7: The distribution of the answers for: “More stringent capital and operational 
risk requirements for banks and financial institutions: Basel 3?”. 
 
The economists have answered in a completely different way to the third measure 
we proposed. We asked if “introducing caps for compensations and bonuses for 
top  managers  and  traders”  can  be  a  measure  to  avoid  future  crises.  The 
respondents think that this measure is less useful. Indeed, more then the 48 per 
cent  of  the  economists  think  that  such  a  tool  can  have  “no  role”  or  only  a 
“marginal role” in reducing the risks of future crises (the option has scored a 
average value extremely low equal to 2.69).  
Regionally speaking, a little different approach in the “regulation and supervision 
of the rating agencies by market authorities” between the Euro Area group, on 
the one hand, and the USA and the UK and Scandinavians groups, on the other 
hand, is stressed by the mean values. The Euro Area group shows a more positive 
approach towards the regulation and the supervision (4.09) with respect to the 
USA (3.61) and the UK and Scandinavians (3.66). Furthermore, differently from 
the  other  areas,  the  UK  and  Scandinavians  group  shows  a  higher  degree  of 
uncertainty. Indeed, in this case, the “some role” option is the second one among 
the possible choices.  
“Introducing caps for compensations and bonuses for top managers and traders” 
is another measure that reveals some difference among areas. In this case, we can 
recognize two opposite approaches. On the one side we have the USA and the 
Other America groups: in these areas the economists think that the caps play a 
marginal role (2.41 and 2.48). Moreover, if we examine the USA distribution, we 
notice that the “no role” option has the highest percentage. On the other side, 
the economists living in  the Euro Area and in the Asia and Oceania groups 
consider that the caps can have “some role” (the mean is, respectively, 3.00 and The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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3.14). The other groups (the Emerging Europe and the UK and Scandinavians) 
show values between these two limits.  
In the Asia and Oceania group, the distribution of the answers for the third 
measure (“introducing caps for compensations and bonuses for top managers 
and traders”) shows that the “some role” option is the most voted one, with the 
29.69 per cent of the choices. We observe a similar result in  the Euro Area 
(26.09%). 
In  the  Emerging  Europe  group  the  situation  is  different.  In  this  region  the 
economists  are  more  cautious  about  the  role  of  the  regulation  of  the  rating 
agencies and about new requirements for banks and financial institutions. Indeed, 
in both the cases the “important role” is the favourite option. Moreover, the 
distribution is bell-shaped and this means that the economists have distributed 
the  answers  among  all  the  options.  So,  the  perception  is  that  the  Emerging 
Europe group is more prudent about these measures. 
The Other America group shows a result similar to the Emerging Europe group 
for the regulation and supervision of the rating agencies. Also in this case the 
“important  role”  option  shows  the  highest  percentage  (35.48%).  The  other 
distributions are substantially in line with the global ones.  
For the UK and Scandinavians group, we observe a different distribution only for 
the first measure. In this case the distribution has two peaks. The “key role” field 
shows the highest percentage (34.04 %) but the “some role” option shows a very 
similar  result  (29.79%).  So,  the  distribution  highlights  that  this  measure  is 
significant, but this group of economists shows a higher degree of prudence in 
comparison with the other groups that we created. 
At the end, in the USA there are no differences in comparison with the global 
situation. 
3.5 – Question 4: Fed vs. market factors 
The  market  factors  get  a  higher  preference  in  comparison  with  the  FED 
monetary policy (58.97% vs. 41.03%). Summarizing the sample answers, we can 
say that the market factors have been more important in causing the subprime 
crisis in comparison with FED’s decisions. Bearing this result in mind, we can 
now show the result for each sub-field.  
According to our expert survey, the first factor that caused the subprime crisis is 
the housing market bubble (19.71), the second is the regulatory and surveillance policy 
(17.58%), the third is the financial firm’s management and rating agencies (16.11%), the 
fourth is the interest rate policy (14.86%), the fifth is the excessive use of derivatives 
(13.10%), the sixth is speculator “stressing” financial markets (6.37%), the seventh is 
the liquidity policy (5.89%), the eighth is the financial fear by retail investors (3.68%) and 
the last is the communication policy (2.69%). 
The regional results, divided as usual in six areas, are in line with the global ones. 
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Table 1: The subprime crisis by area 
  The subprime crisis was caused by: 
Areas  Federal Reserve  
monetary policy  Market factors 
Asia and Oceania  46.61%  53,39% 
Euro Area  44.92%  55.08% 
USA  37.49%  62.51% 
Emerging Europe  40.59%  59.41% 
Other America  40.38%  59.62% 
UK and Scandinavians   39.36%  60.64% 
Total  41.03%  58.97% 
 
The market factors get their highest percentage in the USA and  their lowest 
percentage in the Asia and Oceania group. 
Table 7 shows the second step of this question. There are five factors that show 
high percentages in all the regions. The housing market bubble factor has the 
highest percentage in three regions (the USA, the Emerging Europe and the UK 
and Scandinavians). Indeed, as we have just pointed out, this factor is the most 
important according to our sample. Another important factor is the regulatory 
and surveillance policy of the Fed. This option is the first in two regions, Asia and 
Oceania and Euro Area, and in the other areas shows high percentages. The 
financial  firm’s  management  and  rating  agencies  factor  is  the  most  preferred 
choice in the Other America group. Another important factor is the interest rate 
policy that shows a high percentage in all the six groups. The last important factor 
is the excessive use of derivatives that has a very homogeneous percentage among 
groups.  So,  according  to  our  expert  survey,  these  five  factors  were  the  most 
important in determining the subprime crisis. They are always seen as the most 


































































































































































































































































The other factors have a marginal role. Indeed, the above mentioned five factors 
show percentage above 10 per cent in all the zones, while the other four have 
percentage below 6.5 per cent. The regional results are in line with the global 
mean, and so, we can draw the conclusion that the economists have a precise idea 
about the causes of the subprime crisis. This can be useful in order to re-write the 
regulation of this sector. 
3.6 – Question 5: How do you agree? 
As mentioned above, in this section of the survey we asked to our interviewees to 
indicate how much they agree with five statements we proposed.  
The  first  statement  is:  “the  policy  makers  have  to  rescue  the  markets  and 
consumers confidence using ALL the possible tools (fiscal stimulus, bail out and 
nationalizations)”. In other words, we want to know how much the economists 
agree on the policy makers’ intervention, even using extremely tools as fiscal 
stimulus, bail out and nationalizations. The distribution of the answers shows a 
positive feeling towards a more intrusive activity of the policy makers (Figure 8), a 
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Figure 8: The distribution on how much agreement there is for: “The policy makers 
have  to  rescue  the  markets  and  consumers  confidence  using  ALL  the  possible  tools  (fiscal 
stimulus, bail out and nationalizations)”. 
 
The “75%” and the “100%” options represent more than the 50 per cent of the 
respondents.  So,  in  this  case  there  is  a  global  tendency  in  supporting  the 
intervention of the policy makers. The severity of the crisis leads the economists 
to accept all the possible tools as fiscal stimulus, bail out and nationalizations by 
the policy authorities: the hard public intervention is fundamental in order to re-
establish the confidence. 
We have a not so different situation (see Figure 9) for “the bankruptcy of firms is 
fundamental to “clean” the financial market from “bad” firms” statement. The 
interviewed economists demonstrate a positive feeling also towards this assertion, The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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with a mean of 60.29%. More than the 50 per cent of the respondents chose the 
“75%” or the “100%” fields. But in this case we have to notice that the “75%” 
field shows the highest percentage (29.69%) and that the “50%” field collects the 
24.63 per cent of the choices. There is a positive attitude toward this statement 
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Figure 9: The distribution on how much agreement there is for: “The bankruptcy of 
firms is fundamental to “clean” the financial market from “bad” firms”. 
 
The third proposed statement is similar to the previous one, but it is focus on the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. We want to know if, according to the economists 
we  contacted,  “the  bankruptcy  of  Lehman  Brothers  has  worsened  the  credit 
market confidence”. The option registered a high average agreement of 66.99% 
and its distribution differs from the one of the two preceding answers (Figure 10). 
The “75%” field shows the highest percentage, but after this option we find the 
“100%” field.  These two options collect  the 60 per cent  of  the choices.  We 
observe  a  very  low  number  of  answers  in  the  “0%”  field.  In  this  case  the 
interviewed economists have showed a higher degree of homogeneity. It is wise 
to affirm that, according to the majority of the respondents, the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers has probably worsened the confidence of the market. 
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Figure 10: The distribution on how much agreement there is for: “The bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers has worsened the credit market confidence”. 
 
In addiction, we proposed another question on Lehman Brothers. We asked if 
“the  US  policy  authorities  should  have  prevented  the  collapse  of  Lehman 
Brothers”. The statement registered the lowest mean value (41.71%) and has, for 
the first time, a different distribution (see Figure 11). The “0%” and the “25%” 
fields collect more than the 51 per cent of the choices. Moreover, the 6.37 per 
cent of the (total) economists chose the “I don’t know” option. So, it seems that 
the economists do not agree with this statement.  
As a consequence, as we have just noticed, the economists think that the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy damaged the confidence of the market, but showed a high 
degree of agreement recognizing that the authorities did the right thing when they 
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Figure 11: The distribution on how much agreement there is for: “The US policy 
authorities should have prevented the collapse of Lehman Brothers”. 
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The last  statement is focused on the relationship  between private and  public 
sectors.  We  wanted  to  know  how  much  agreement  there  is  in  “avoiding  the 
private  sector  cashing  the  profits  upfront  and  the  public  sector  bearing  the 
financial risk (financial distress) ex post”. The result is very clear, 77.79% agrees 
on the statement. About the 50 per cent of the economists chose the “100%” 
field. This is the highest percentage among the five statements we proposed in 
this  section.  The  distribution  shows  very  low  percentages  for  the  “0%”  and 
“25%” fields. But a particular feature of this question is that the “I don’t know” 
field reaches a very high percentage: 14.15 per cent of the total respondents. In 
sum, in this case a large majority agrees with the statement, but also an important 
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Figure 12: The distribution on how much agreement there is for: “Avoiding the 
private sector cashing the profits upfront and the public sector bearing the financial risk (financial 
distress) ex post”. 
 
This is the analysis of the global situation. The regional analysis shows some 
interesting results (see the appendix for more data).  
For mean values, substantial differences emerge between the Euro Area and the 
USA. The economists of the first group gave a higher vote to the first (the use of 
ALL  tools)  and  the  third  (the  role  of  the  Lehman  Brothers  bankruptcy  in 
worsening  the  credit  market  confidence)  statements,  64.27%  and  72.49%,  in 
comparison with the US economists, 54.63% and 62.50%. The contrary is true 
for the second (the bankruptcy of firms is fundamental to “clean” the financial 
market from “bad” firms) and the fourth statements (the US policy authorities 
should have prevented the collapse of Lehman Brothers). In these cases, the 
Euro  Area  shows  a  sort  of  indecision  (respectively  53.99%  and  52.31%)  in 
contrast with a broad agreement of the USA group (64.24% and 36.18%). 
For the statements about the rescue of the Lehman Brothers, in general, we have 
that all the six areas seem to be divided on two sides. On the one hand there is 
the “USA side”, that is contrary to an intervention by authorities, in which there 
are the Asia and Oceania (36.90%), the Emerging Europe (27.63%) and the UK The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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and Scandinavians (36.47) groups. Opposed to this side there is the “undecided 
group” composed by the Euro Area and by the Other America (49.09%). 
Some  differences  emerge  also  for  distributions.  For  example,  the  Asia  and 
Oceania  group  is  more  prudent  about  the  role  of  the  Lehman  Brothers 
bankruptcy in worsening the credit market confidence. Indeed, the “25%” and 
the “50%” options collect the same votes of the “75%” and “100%” fields. This 
is a particular feature of this group.  
In  the  Emerging  Europe  group  the  distribution  of  the  answers  to  the  first 
statement shows a different trend. Indeed, we observe the peak in the “50%” 
field (31.58%). Moreover, a substantially equal number of economists chose the 
“0%”-“25%”  options  and  the  “75%”-“100%”  fields.  So,  there  is  not  a  clear 
approach towards this statement. The economists of this zone did not have a 
unanimous agreement about the interventions of the policy makers.  
In the Euro Area there are two results that are not in line with the global mean. 
The first difference is the distribution of the answers to the second statement. In 
this case the Euro Area economists did not show a unanimous feeling towards 
the bankruptcy of firms. More than the 30 per cent of the respondents chose the 
“0%”  or  the  “25%”  fields.  Furthermore,  the  “50%”  field  shows  the  highest 
percentage (28.17%). So, the result is very different from the one obtained with 
the global view. The second difference is in the distribution of the answers to the 
fourth  statement.  The  respondents  do  not  reveal  a  clear  preference.  The 
percentages of the fields (we do not consider the “I don’t know” option) are all 
very similar and there is not a well defined shape of the distribution. So, we can 
draw the conclusion that the Euro Area economists do not precisely indicate if 
the US policy authorities should have prevented the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
The Other America group shows many particular features. First, the distribution 
of the answers to the first statement is different in comparison with the global 
aggregate. Indeed, in this case the “75%” field shows the highest percentage. But 
the final result is substantially the same: the policy makers have to rescue the 
markets and consumers confidence using all the possible tools. On the other 
hand,  these  economists  show  a  very  precise  feeling  towards  the  role  of  the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Indeed, in this case the “100%” field shows the 
highest percentage and none of the respondents chose the “0%” option. As a 
consequence, we can affirm that the economists of this group firmly believe that 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers has worsened the credit market confidence. 
The last different result is also linked with Lehman Brothers. The respondents do 
not reveal a clear preference when we ask if the US policy authorities should have 
prevented the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The “25%”, “50%” and “75%” options 
show  the  same  percentage.  Moreover,  the  “0%”  and  the  “100%”  fields 
substantially have the same percentages (23.64% vs. 21.82%). As a consequence, 
in this case it is impossible to draw any kind of conclusion about the thought of 
the economists with respect to this issue. 
The distribution of the answers of the economists from the USA is in line with 
the global distribution that we have analysed in the previous pages. There is only 
a specific feature with respect to the first statement (“the policy makers have to 
rescue the markets and consumers confidence using ALL the possible tools (fiscal 
stimulus, bail  out and nationalizations)”).  It  seems that these  respondents are 
more prudent in comparison with other zones. Indeed the “0%” and the “25%” The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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fields show a higher percentage in comparison with the global value, while the 
other three fields show a lower percentage. As a consequence, the USA mean is 
lower than the global one (54.63% vs. 59.99%) and so our perception is that this 
group of economists has a lower predisposition towards the state intervention.  
The UK and Scandinavians group shows results in line with the global mean.  
3.7 – Question 6: The monetary policy of FED and ECB judged 
To give a judgment of the monetary policy of the European Central Bank and of 
the Federal Reserve, we asked to judge four different aspects of the monetary 
policy of the two above mentioned central banks: 1) the interest rate policy; 2) the 
regulatory and surveillance policy; 3) the liquidity and bailout policy; and 4) the 
communication policy. In the Table 3 we summarized all the results obtained. 
 
Table 3: Judgment of the Federal Reserve and of the European Central Bank by 
area and aspects 
  interest rate policy  regulatory and surveillance policy 
Areas  FED  ECB  FED  ECB 
Asia and 
Oceania  58.90%  54.81%  42.37%  53.06% 
Emerging 
Europe  58.75%  58.75%  36.84%  57.89% 
Euro Area  55.28%  51.77%  37.23%  52.25% 
Other America  64.90%  55.36%  43.00%  49.38% 
UK and 
Scandinavians   62.35%  54.69%  41.99%  49.67% 
USA  58.83%  45.78%  39.81%  43.52% 
Total  58.83%  51.32%  39.69%  49.61% 
 
  liquidity and bailout policy  communication policy 
Areas  FED  ECB  FED  ECB 
Asia and 
Oceania  52.16%  57.69%  45.67%  53.26% 
Emerging 
Europe  54.17%  59.21%  52.63%  60.53% 
Euro Area  55.86%  61.39%  47.27%  48.91% 
Other America  61.82%  61.59%  52.08%  52.78% 
UK and 
Scandinavians  60.06%  58.64%  55.38%  52.30% 
USA  53.45%  52.44%  44.85%  44.24% 
Total  55.63%  58.11%  48.00%  49.21% The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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The  data  highlight  some  important  differences  about  the  perception  of  the 
policies carried out by the two central banks.  The interest rate policy by the 
Federal Reserve dominates the policy by the ECB. One possible explanation is that 
the  economists  appreciate  the  rapidity  and  the  magnitude  of  the  FED 
intervention while, on the contrary, they do not appreciate the (first raising and 
the following) slow and delayed easing of the interest rate policy by the ECB. 
Besides, the Euro Area economists evaluate the FED interest rate policy better 
than the ECB one. As regards the interest rate policy, the only exception is the 
Emerging Europe group with an equal value for the interest rate policy of both 
the Central Banks. Finally, this is the aspect in which the FED gets its highest 
vote. 
For the regulatory and surveillance policy, the ECB get a higher vote in all the 
areas. Even the USA economists consider the ECB better than the FED in this 
aspect of their monetary policy. The mean of the total sample stresses a very big 
difference between the FED and the ECB, and this is the sector in which the 
FED gets its lowest mark.   
A not so sharp difference between the two central banks emerges for the liquidity 
and bailout policy. Indeed, the ECB shows higher percentages in three zones. In 
the other three areas the FED gets a better result, but, at the end, the difference is 
very little. For this aspect the ECB gets its highest mark. So, according to the 
economists that we interviewed, the liquidity and bailout policy of the ECB has 
been particularly efficient. 
With respect to the communication policy, the ECB gets a higher global mean in 
comparison with the one of the FED, although the difference is not sharp. In this 
case the ECB gets a higher mark in four areas. The FED wins in the USA but the 
difference is very limited. Considering all the respondents the differences between 
the two Central Banks for the communication policy is the lowest among the 
four policy monetary aspects analyzed. 
Table 4 shows the global judgment of the monetary policy of the two Central 
Banks for the different areas examined. 
 
Table 4: Global judgment of the Federal Reserve and of the European Central 
Bank monetary policies by area 
Areas  FED  ECB 
Asia and Oceania  49.77%  54.71% 
Emerging Europe  50.60%  59.10% 
Euro Area  48.91%  53.58% 
Other America  55.45%  54.77% 
UK and Scandinavians   54.95%  53.83% 
USA  49.23%  46.50% 
Total  50.54%  52.06% 
The global judgment is obtained as mean of the four aspects discussed above. The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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The ECB got a higher vote in comparison with the FED in three areas (Asia and 
Oceania, the Euro Area and Emerging Europe). On the contrary, the Fed won in 
the other three areas (the USA, Other America, UK and Scandinavians). The 
ECB and the FED got a higher vote in comparison with the other central bank in 
their own region. So, the nations where the central banks operate appreciate the 
overall monetary policy of their own central bank. The ECB got a mean above 50 
per cent in all the zones, except for the USA, while the Fed got a mean below 50 
per cent in three regions, including the USA.  
The global mean is above 50 per cent for the two central banks, but the ECB got 
a higher score. 
3.8 – Question 7: Due to the financial crisis … 
As  mentioned  above  in  Section  2,  unfortunately  we  committed  an  error  in 
constructing  the  question.  “Sorry  -  couldn't  make  sense  of  this  question  (or, 
rather,  of  the  percentage  scoring  mechanism)”  is  a  comment  of  one  of  our 
respondents and summarize in a good way the error. It lies just in the percentage 
scoring that we wrongly limited upper to 100 and does not make possible an 
aggregation of the answers. However a good number noted the error and then we 
have decided to analyze these correct answers. 
Table 5 reports the mean value of percentages for the entire sample and the 
following areas: Euro Area, USA and UK and Scandinavians
9. 
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Euro Area  78.28%  44.48%  58.04%  53.28%  71.55% 
UK and 
Scandinavians  85.68%  52.23%  70.45%  66.59%  66.14% 
USA  79.69%  47.55%  63.65%  71.04%  58.72% 
Total  80.10%  49.47%  61.53%  62.44%  63.48% 
 
According to our expert survey, due to the financial crisis the “state intervention 
in the economy will grow” almost certainly with a scored mean value of about 
80%. In particular, the UK and Scandinavians areas showed the highest value 
(85.68%), while the Euro Area and the USA registered similar values. 
On the contrary, there is high uncertainty about the change of “the structure of 
the international trade” with values around 50%. But analysing the data we can 
draw the conclusion that, presumably, the Euro Area and the USA expect some, 
though small, changes. 
                                                 
9 We do not take into account other areas, previously considered, because the error reduced the number of 
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Fairly consistent views emerge looking at “the rate of development of emerging 
economies” that is considered declining in the near future. The most optimistic 
are the respondents of the Euro Area (58.04%) and the most pessimistic are the 
UK and Scandinavians economists (70.45%). 
A mixed picture emerges on “the role of the dollar as a reserve currency”. There 
is a general, although not very strong, view that the Dollar will continue its role 
(62.44%), but it emerges the clearly difference between the Euro Area and the 
USA. The respondents seem to be very nationalistic. In the Euro Area the mean 
value (53.28%) is slightly above the value of the uncertainty (50%), stressing the 
growing  importance  of  the  Euro,  while  the  second  group  agrees  on  the 
prominent role of the US Dollar also in the future (71.04%). 
As regards “the international effort to fight global warming” ”, the majority of the 
economists expects a decrease in the efforts. In the Euro Area we find the most 
pessimistic view (71.55%) and in the USA the most optimistic one (58.72%). It is 
curious to  notice that the Euro Area,  the world leader in fighting  the global 
warming, registers a so high value and that the USA, one of the few countries not 
yet  signatories  to  the  Kyoto  Protocol,  shows  the  best  value.  The  level  of 
investments and efforts, highest in the Euro Area and lowest in the USA, or an 
Obama-effect on the environmental policy of the American country could be 
some possible explanations of this strange result. 
3.9 – Open questions 
At the end of the survey, we proposed three open questions. It is impossible to 
reproduce all the answers. As a consequence, we indicate the global feeling of the 
respondents and, in order to give a direct perception of their feeling, we chose six 
of their sentences for each question. The first open question was focused on the 
approach of the Fed towards the US housing market: “do you think the Fed 
should have paid more attention to the US housing market bubble and should 
have tried bursting it in advance?” In this case, analysing the formulation of the 
sentences, we notice that the majority of our respondents gave a positive answer. 
In other words, they think that the FED should have operated in order to limit 
the growth of the bubble. The result is plain, but we decided to show three 
positive  and  three  negative  answers.  In  this  way  we  also  show  the  criticisms 
towards this vision. Obviously, we have tried to choose the most representative 
sentences in our view. The three positive answers we chose are: 1) “Yes. The Fed 
should have realized that it was creating a bubble with excessively loose monetary 
policy during the first part of the decade. Having gotten burned with the burst of 
the stock market bubble in 2000, the “dumb money” flowed into housing, with 
low interest rates encouraging the flow”; 2) “Yes, if you look at the evolution of 
housing prices in the last couple of years, they should have known a crash was 
coming and acted upon it by tightening credit and increasing checks on the loan 
policies of the commercial banks”; and 3) “Yes. They continued to ignore the 
housing  bubble  and  forecast  that  it  would  be  separate  from  the  rest  of  the 
economy. From summer 2007 until March 2008 they continued to deny the effect 
it would have on the rest of the economy”. 
The three negative answers are: 4) “I am not sure it was responsibility of the 
FED. I think FANNIE and FREDDIE are de facto federal agencies and they The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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should  have  had  more  careful  underwriting  standards”;  5)  “Not  the  housing 
bubble specifically. The Fed should not have been engaged in trying to manage 
the real side of the economy through monetary policy. Ultimately, all the Fed can 
control is inflation, and its attempt to use monetary policy as a short-run tool to 
soften the recession was harmful”; and 6) “No – the problem began with changes 
imposed on the banking industry by the Carte and Clinton administrations. The 
Fed could do little in the early years of this decade, when actions should have 
been taken, because of the economic weakness at that time”. 
We follow the same approach with the second open question: “what do you think 
about  the  international  coordination  among  central  banks  in  response  to  the 
credit crisis? Do you think it would be desirable to extend the coordination also 
to normal conditions?”. Even in this case a very large majority of the respondents 
gave a positive answer. There is a wide positive feeling towards a more degree of 
coordination  among  central  banks.  But  there  are  many  sceptics  about  the 
usefulness of the coordination during normal economic periods. As done before, 
we chose three positive and three negative answers: 1) “The coordination among 
central banks is crucial, not only in extreme cases (a financial crisis), but in normal 
economic conditions”; 2) “I think the banks should have coordinated sooner and 
be clearer. Most should have followed the British example. I think coordination is 
good  and  should  be  extended  to  normal  circumstances”;  3)  “International 
coordination  among  central  banks  will  solve  some  problems,  but  present 
managing  this  situation  by  central  bank  was  quite  sufficient.  To  extend  the 
coordination for normal conditions, depends on circumstances”; 4) “Rather not. 
Each  central  bank  should  be  as  independent  from  the  others  as  possible. 
Coordination  can  be  a  good  thing  in  extraordinary  times,  but  should  not  be 
extended  to  normal  condition.  In  normal  times  the  markets  work  for 
themselves”;  5)  “The  international  coordination  seems  to  be  a  signal  to  the 
general public that central banks are trying to solve the credit crisis rather than a 
solution itself. History suggests that international coordination is hard to sustain 
because of countries’ divergent interests”; and 6) “No, I don’t think so. If CBs 
have been a good cause of this crisis, imagine if they were coordinated”. 
“What  do  you  think  about  the  possibility  and  feasibility  of  an  international 
authority with surveillance and regulatory powers (not only a consulting role) on 
financial risks taken by the financial system?” is the third, and last, proposed open 
question. In this case we notice a general negative feeling. Indeed, a large part of 
the respondents think that this is a good thing in theory but that exist many 
difficulties  to  implement  such  an  international  authority.  Moreover,  there  are 
many respondents that are completely adverse. They think that in this way the 
burocracy will be increased and that the financial world does not need more rules. 
In this case we propose twelve answers because the opinions are very different; 
we try to catch all these differences through a larger number of answers. 1) “I 
think it is inevitable and it will be extremely important going forward if we want 
to see a safe and  sound  international financial system”; 2) “I  think  that in a 
globalized  economy,  it  is  crucial  to  have  coordinated  economic  regulation.  I 
would welcome such efforts!”; 3) “Good idea. Markets  do not regulate  by it 
selves,  as  this  crisis  has  been  showing  us”;  4)  “Something  along  lines  of  the 
original Keynes Bretton Woods proposal would be desirable and could become 
politically feasible as depression persists”; 5) “This might be ideal, but is not The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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feasible. I think that national authorities could do better in surveillance of both 
domestic  and  international  operations”;  6)  “It  would  be  very  desirable  but 
currently it is hardly politically feasible. Other countries will not allow the U.S.A. 
to dominate such authority. Whether the U.S.A. will join it if it does not dominate 
it is an open question – with respect to today’s presidential elections”; 7) “It 
would be a good idea, but I do not think it is feasible as some countries just enjoy 
the free ride”; 8) “Such an institution would be economically reasonable, but 
hardly feasible in reality. An alternative could be to empower World Bank or IMF 
with more functions”; 9) “No chance. I guess you have to be part of the EU to 
dream  up  something  as  potentially  horrible  as  this”;  10)  “Quis  custodet 
custodem…?”; 11) “Truly idiotic. Communism is stupid enough within individual 
countries. Global communism would be disastrous for humanity”; 12) “It’s a bad 
idea. What is needed is (a) gold as a stable unit of account, (b) multiple possible 
media  of  exchange,  (c)  multiple  possible  media  or  redemption.  Convertibility 
needs to be restored. Central bank should be phased out. It has been ruinous as 
the 20
th century clearly shows”. 
This is a very limited part of the answers that we received, but we think that they 
can reproduce fairly well the global feeling and the different thoughts that have 
emerged.  
4 – Academics vs. non-Academics 
Here  we  draw  some  differences  between  Academics  and  non-Academics 
(enterprises and journalists) respondents. 
For  the  first  question  on  “factors  contributing  to  the  credit  crisis”  some 
differences arise in judging the “easy monetary policy by the Fed in the early 
2000s” for which non-Academics have attributed a higher importance as cause of 
the  crisis  (4.03  against  3.71).  In  addition,  they  give  less  importance  to  “the 
misleading  quantification  (by  rating  agencies)  of  derivative  instruments’ 
counterpart and liquidity risks” (3.93 with respect to 4.25 of Academics) and to 
the “moral hazard by the mortgage formerly state owned insurers, i.e. Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac” (3.39 with respect to 3.65 of Academics).  
Another difference emerges looking at the distribution of answers for the factor 
of “low capitalization of banks and financial intermediaries with respect to the 
risks taken by them”. Even if the mean value for the two groups is really close 
(3.84 for Academics and 3.81 for non-Academics), the two distributions are quite 
different  (Figure  13).  For  Academics  the  “important  role”  is  the  most  rated 
option with a record of about 40% of answers, a sign of good agreement in 
answers. While for non-Academics, the “some role” and the “key role” options 
have the same rate denoting a no broad consensus among them. 













No role Marginal role Some role Important role Key role
Academics non-Academics
 
Figure 13: Distribution of answers for “low capitalization of banks and financial 
intermediaries with respect to the risks taken by them”. 
 
Differences expand for the second and third question on the “measures to fix the 
credit crisis today” and “to avoid occurring again tomorrow”. As showed in Table 
6, non-Academics, with respect to Academics, valued more important to fix the 
crisis  the  “public  capital  injection  into  banks  (public  recapitalization)”,  the 
“liquidity pumped into markets by Central Banks”, the “Fed “Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility” (CPFF) to buy commercial papers” and the “US “Toxic Assets 
Relief Project” (TARP) to buy toxic assets”. On the other side, they judged less 
important the “temporary bans on short sales of financial stocks”, the “regulation 
and supervision of the rating agencies by market authorities” and “introducing 
caps for compensations and bonuses for top managers and traders”. 
Asking who among the Fed and market factors had more contributed to the 
subprime crisis, Academics considered market factors predominant with respect 
to the Federal Reserve monetary policy (a mean value of about 60% against to 
about 40%). Thinks change for non-Academics for which the two factors are 
almost equally responsible (respectively about 52% and about 48%). This shift in 
judgment is due to the change in importance of the “interest rate policy” of the 
USA monetary policy authorities that is considered by non-Academics at par with 
the “housing market bubble” the first cause of the subprime crisis (for Academics 
the Fed monetary policy is considered the fourth cause after, for importance, the 
“housing  market  bubble”,  “regulatory  and  surveillance  policy”  and  “financial 
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Table 6: Mean value for measures to  fix the credit crisis  today and to avoid 
occurring again tomorrow for Academics and non-Academics 
Measures to fix the credit crisis today  Academics  non-
Academics 
Public  capital  injection  into  banks  (public 
recapitalization)  3.65  4.10 
The liquidity pumped into markets by Central Banks  3.60  3.95 
The  Fed  “Commercial  Paper  Funding  Facility” 
(CPFF) to buy commercial papers  3.22  3.70 
Extensions of the deposit assurance by Governments  3.40  3.57 
The US “Toxic Assets Relief Project” (TARP) to buy 
“toxic assets”  2.86  3.22 
Temporary bans on short sales of financial stocks   2.34  1.93 
The institution of supranational funds for Europe and 
Asia countries  2.85  2.62 
The institution of a clearing house by Central Banks 
for interbank markets  3.22  3.06 
Measures to avoid occurring again tomorrow  Academics  non-
Academics 
Regulation and supervision of the rating agencies by 
market authorities  3.81  3.37 
More  stringent  capital  and  operational  risk 
requirements  for  banks  and  financial  institutions: 
Basel 3? 
4.10  4.05 
Introducing caps for compensations and bonuses for 
top managers and traders  2.72  2.34 
 
Opinions  among  the  two  groups  are  not  perfectly  in  harmony  also  for  the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers (Question 5). Non-Academics showed a not clear 
signal if “the US policy authorities should have prevented the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers”. The mean value is around 50% contrary to a 40% for Academics that 
expressed a contrary opinion to the rescue of the financial firms. The indecision 
of non-Academics is also pointed out by the distribution of answers that for each 
option showed an almost equal percentage of answers. Finally, the two groups are 
in line in saying that “the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers has worsened the The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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credit market confidence” (the non-Academics stressed this point with a value of 
about 76% more than the 66% of Academics). 
For Question 6, non-Academics assigned higher judgment of optimality for the 
Fed policy, in all the four fields proposed, with respect to Academics. While for 
the  European  Central  Bank  policy  we  have  mixed  results.  Overall,  non-
Academics  valued  a  little  better  with  respect  to  Academics  the  policy  of  the 
Federal Reserve (about 55% against about 50%) and they expressed the same 
judgment  for  the  European  Central  Bank  (about  52%  for  each  of  the  two 
groups). 
Another difference between Academics and non-Academics is represented by the 
percentage of respondents that chose the “I don’t know” option. With only some 
occasional exceptions, non-Academics showed a sign of high grade of decision 
with a lower percentage of “I don’t know”. 
These  results  highlight  a  very  important  conclusion.  It  seems  that  the  non-
Academics are very alert in defending their positions. That is, they judge too 
much  intrusive  some  of  the  actions  that  we  proposed.  So,  analysing  the 
development of the crisis, we can affirm that the non-Academics (most of them 
are managers or financial analysts) seek for the state support of their business, but 
they  reject  a  direct  supervision  of  the  policy  makers  on  their  own  activities. 
Paraphrasing  some well  known sentences, with irony, we can summarize this 
behaviour with two statements: “In State we trust, but don’t touch my personal 
business”. 
In the following paragraph we will try to draw some conclusions that can shed 
some light on the global crisis that we are experiencing.  
5 – Summary and future researches  
In order to inspect what the global perception of the crisis is, we have prepared a 
questionnaire and we have interviewed 772 economists all around the world.  
The most important results are the following: the core of the crisis is the housing 
market; the crisis will last for one or two years; there is the necessity for an 
improved regulation; the FED and the ECB did a sufficient job in managing the 
crisis; the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy has been fundamental for the worsening 
of the development of the crisis; the coordination of the central banks in this 
critical  period  is  positive  and  there  is  a  high  degree  of  scepticism  about  the 
constitution of an international surveillance authority. We have highlighted these 
results in the preceding pages and so, in this last section, we prefer to go one step 
ahead. Indeed, we decided to focus our attention on the most controversial and 
special features that have emerged. Obviously, in this section the deductions are 
based on our point of views, and so this can lead to personal interpretations. But 
our primary intention is to highlight the features that hit our attention during the 
analysis of the data.  
First of all, we are a little bit surprised by the distribution of the answers on the 
“tight  monetary  policy  by  the  Fed  before  the  subprime  crisis”.  Indeed,  the 
respondents did not give to that type of policy an important role in causing the 
crisis.  And,  we  think  that  this  is  strange  considering  the  fact  that  the  tight 
monetary policy created large difficulties for the borrowers (especially families) 
that got a mortgage loan with a fluctuating interest rate component.  The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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Another  important  result  is  the  one  about  the  role  of  the  mortgage  linked 
derivatives. The distribution of the answers is clear: the respondents think that 
these financial products contributed to the crisis. A possible conclusion is that the 
derivatives are usually used to get high returns, to speculate and not to hedge the 
risk that is their natural purpose. This is an important finding in order to give a 
clear  message  to  markets’  players.  The  market  of  the  derivatives  should  be 
regulated in order to link the use of these instruments to a real need, and not to a 
speculative function. This consideration on the derivatives can be linked with 
other  two  findings.  Indeed,  the  majority  of  the  respondents  think  that  the 
regulation was not adequate, that the derivatives created turbulences and that the 
rating agencies did not evaluate in a good way the risks of the derivatives. If this is 
the core of the crisis, then one can question why the economists did not alert the 
financial world in advance. Probably, only a minority of the economists was really 
aware about the ongoing situation and only the explosion of the crisis made the 
majority of them conscious of the dramatic financial condition of the markets. 
About this matter we can remember the so called First Law of Cartoon Physics: 
any  body  suspended  in  space  will  remain  in  space  until  made  aware  of  its 
situation. In sum, we think that there are two conclusions that can be highlighted: 
first,  the  economists  did  not  understand  the  extent  of  this  crisis  in  advance; 
second, this error should lead to a more meticulous investigation of the financial 
and economic situation for the future analyses.  
Another interesting aspect of our survey is the feeling towards the bans on short 
selling. The majority of the economists in our sample think that this action is not 
highly useful. As a consequence, we question why some authorities introduced 
such a measure. Probably it is linked with the will to restore the confidence in the 
market. Especially, it could be a signal for the non-professional market operators 
(for the man of the street). But, if this is the real justification, we can rightly say 
that the authorities took (and take) decisions on the basis of the market sentiment 
and not on the basis of a rational analysis of the situation. That is, the authorities 
made (and make) what the markets wanted (and want). This conclusion can open 
a large debate on the role of the market surveillance and regulatory authorities. 
The last thing that we want to point out is the distribution of the answers about 
the end of this crisis. In the paper, we have analysed the global result, but we did 
not consider the “I don't know” option. The 16.44 per cent of the respondents 
chose this field and this is one of the highest percentages for this field in all the 
survey. This question was very simple, and so we can interpret this result as a 
difficulty in predicting the end of the crisis. That is, this crisis is different from the 
previous ones and probably a large part of the economists that we interviewed is 
not able to properly catch its evolution and to indicate a precise period in which a 
normal situation will be restored. This finding is obviously negative; the 16 per 
cent  of  the  economists  of  this  survey  has  not  a  precise  idea  about  the 
development  of  this  crisis.  Probably,  the  ordinary  economic  tools  and  the 
dominant economic theories have lost a part of their usefulness in this context. 
These are, in few words, the features of the survey that are most controversial.  
In  this  paper  we  used  a  descriptive  statistical  approach.  Our  next  step  is  to 
examine, with an econometric approach, what are the possible determinants of 
the feeling of respondents to the crisis. The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
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APPENDIX A: THE QUESTIONAIRE 
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLES’ STATISTICS 
Here we reported some descriptive statistics on the sample. The data are divided 
by questions, by single factors of each question and by areas. For each factor and 
area, in the first row we reported the number of respondents that chose the field. 
In the second and third row we have the corresponding percentages, respectively 
considering and not considering the “I don’t know” option. We considered only 
accurate and coherent answers; wrong answers are not included in the sample. 
Finally, as mentioned above in Section 2, the respondents of South Africa (1) and 
Switzerland  (12)  are  considered  in  the  analysis  of  the  total  sample  and  for 
differences between the Academics and the non-Academics. 
 
Question 1 – FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CREDIT CRISIS 
  No role  Marginal 
role  Some role  Important 
role  Key role  I don’t know 
Easy monetary policy by the Fed in the early 2000s 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 94) 





























































Tight monetary policy by the Fed before the subprime crisis (in 2005-06) 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 
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Question 1 – FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CREDIT CRISIS 
  No role  Marginal 
role  Some role  Important 
role  Key role  I don’t know 
Changes of the monetary policy stance by the Fed in the 2000s (e.g. the strong variability of the Federal Funds rate) 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 93) 





























































A regulation inadequate to keep apace with the deep and fast financial innovation 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 65)  


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 





























































The fragmentation (among various authorities) of the surveillance system in the US 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 94) 
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Question 1 – FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CREDIT CRISIS 
  No role  Marginal 
role  Some role  Important 
role  Key role  I don’t know 
The increasing share of approvals of mortgages to borrowers with low credit ratings (subprime mortgages) in the 2000s 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 





























































The housing market bubble 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 65) 
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(respondents: 95) 





























































The wide use and international diffusion of mortgage linked derivative instruments such as ABS (Asset Backed Securities) and 
CDO (Collateralized Debt Obligations) 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 
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(respondents: 95) 
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Question 1 – FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CREDIT CRISIS 
  No role  Marginal 
role  Some role  Important 
role  Key role  I don’t know 
The misleading quantification (by rating agencies) of derivative instruments’ counterpart and liquidity risks 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 





























































Low capitalization of banks and financial intermediaries with respect to the risks taken by them 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 64) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 





























































Too aggressive earning policy by bank and financial system management 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 
































































 The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
 
47 
Question 1 – FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CREDIT CRISIS 
  No role  Marginal 
role  Some role  Important 
role  Key role  I don’t know 
Moral hazard by the mortgage formerly state owned insurers (i.e. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 





























































Moral hazard by financial/insurance firms too big to fail (i.e. Bear Stearns, AIG) 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 65) 
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(respondents: 95) 






























































IN YOUR VIEW, THE CRISIS WILL END (OR A NORMAL FINANCIAL SITUATION WILL BE RESTORED) BY 












2011  I don’t 
know 
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Question 2 – MEASURES TO FIX THE CREDIT CRISIS TODAY 
  No role  Marginal 
role  Some role  Important 
role  Key role  I don’t know 
Public capital injection into banks (public recapitalization) 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 94) 





























































The liquidity pumped into markets by Central Banks 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 





























































The Fed “Commercial Paper Funding Facility” (CPFF) to buy commercial papers 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 94) 
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Question 2 – MEASURES TO FIX THE CREDIT CRISIS TODAY 
  No role  Marginal 
role  Some role  Important 
role  Key role  I don’t know 
Extensions of the deposit assurance by Governments 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 





























































The US “Toxic Assets Relief Project” (TARP) to buy “toxic assets” 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 





























































Temporary bans on short sales of financial stocks 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 
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Question 2 – MEASURES TO FIX THE CREDIT CRISIS TODAY 
  No role  Marginal 
role  Some role  Important 
role  Key role  I don’t know 
The institution of supranational funds for Europe and Asia countries 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 64) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 





























































The institution of a clearing house by Central Banks for interbank markets 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 














































































 The International Financial Crisis: An Expert Survey                                                     Forte, A. and Pesce, G. 
 
51 
Question 3 – MEASURES TO AVOID THE CREDIT CRISIS OCCURRING AGAIN TOMORROW 
  No role  Marginal 
role  Some role  Important 
role  Key role  I don’t know 
Regulation and supervision of the rating agencies by market authorities 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 





























































More stringent capital and operational risk requirements for banks and financial institutions: Basel 3? 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 





























































Introducing caps for compensations and bonuses for top managers and traders 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 95) 
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Question 5 – HOW DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? 
  0%  25%  50%  75%  100%  I don’t know 
The policy makers have to rescue the markets and consumers confidence using ALL the possible tools (fiscal stimulus, bail out 
and nationalizations) 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 64) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 94) 





























































The bankruptcy of firms is fundamental to “clean” the financial market from “bad” firms 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 94) 





























































The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers has worsened the credit market confidence 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
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Question 5 – HOW DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? 
  0%  25%  50%  75%  100%  I don’t know 
The US policy authorities should have prevented the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 94) 





























































Avoiding the private sector cashing the profits upfront and the public sector bearing the financial risk (financial distress) ex post 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 
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(respondents: 91) 
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Question 6 – JUDGE THE OPTIMALITY OF MONETARY POLICY DURING THE CRISIS 
  0%  25%  50%  75%  100%  I don’t know 
FED interest rates policy 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 90) 





























































FED regulatory and surveillance policy 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 90) 





























































FED liquidity (and bail out) policy 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 64) 
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(respondents: 90) 
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Question 6 – JUDGE THE OPTIMALITY OF MONETARY POLICY DURING THE CRISIS 
  0%  25%  50%  75%  100%  I don’t know 
FED communication policy 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 65) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 90) 





























































ECB interest rates policy 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 64) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 89) 





























































ECB regulatory and surveillance policy 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 63) 
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(respondents: 89) 
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Question 6 – JUDGE THE OPTIMALITY OF MONETARY POLICY DURING THE CRISIS 
  0%  25%  50%  75%  100%  I don’t know 
ECB liquidity (and bail out) policy 
Asia and Oceania 
(respondents: 64) 


















































































UK and Scandinavians  
(respondents: 89) 





























































ECB communication policy 
Asia and Oceania  
(respondents: 64) 
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